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Police, Race, and the Production of 
Capital Homicides 
Jeffrey Fagan† 
Amanda Geller* 
Racial disparities in capital punishment have been well 
documented for decades. Over 50 studies have shown that Black 
defendants are more likely than their White counterparts to be charged 
with capital-eligible crimes, to be convicted, and to be sentenced to death. 
Racial disparities in charging and sentencing in capital-eligible 
homicides are largest for the small number of cases where Black 
defendants murder White victims compared to within-race killings, or the 
rare instances where Whites murder Black or other ethnic minority 
victims. These patterns are robust to rich controls for non-racial 
characteristics and state sentencing guidelines. This article backs up the 
research on racial disparities to an earlier stage of capital case 
processing: the production of capital-eligible cases beginning with the 
identification of potential defendants by the police. It seeks to trace these 
sentencing disparities to earlier stages in the processing of homicides. 
Using data from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, we examine 
every homicide reported between 1976 and 2009, and find that homicides 
with White victims are significantly more likely to be “cleared” by the 
arrest of a suspect than are homicides with minority victims. We estimate 
a series of hierarchical regressions to show that a substantial portion of 
this disparity is explained by social and demographic characteristics of 
the county in which homicides take place. Most notably, counties with 
large concentrations of minority residents have lower clearance rates 
than do predominantly White counties; however, county characteristics 
do not fully explain the observed race-of-victim disparities. Our findings 
raise equal protection concerns, paving the way for further research into 
the production of capital-eligible homicides and the administration of the 
death penalty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Racial disparities have been endemic to the administration of 
capital punishment in the U.S. since the nation’s founding.1 Before the 
Civil War, many Southern states explicitly legislated that slaves – and 
sometimes free Blacks – could be sentenced to death for crimes 
punishable by lesser penalties when committed by Whites.2 Although the 
14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibited the imposition of 
differential penalties by race for the same crime – and explicitly 
prohibited “the hanging of a Black man for a crime for which the White 
man is not to be hanged” (39th Congress, 1866), the death penalty has 
continued to be used predominantly upon African-American defendants 
and those convicted of crimes against White victims throughout the 
country’s history. 
A robust research literature confirms that racial disparities have 
infected capital punishment to the present day.3 Between 1930, when 
 
DOI:  https://doi.org/10.15779/Z382R3NX4X  
Copyright © 2018 Regents of University of California   
†Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Professor of 
Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. Thanks to 
Gregory Bernstein, Morgan Buras and Zach Chen for excellent research assistance. James 
Alan Fox generously shared an augmented SHR data file from 1976-2016.  Franklin 
Zimring inspired this project in 2006 with his market share theory of deterrence and 
capital punishment. His footprints are all over this project, and we are deeply in his debt. 
Portions of this essay appeared in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK TO POLICING IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Tamara Rice Lave and Eric Miller, eds. 2019). 
* Associate Clinical Professor, Department of Sociology, New York University.1 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After 
McCleskey, in 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 35 (2007) (“A cardinal feature of the 
death penalty in the United States has always been its racially biased use.”). 
 2  See, e.g., WILLIAM BOWERS, GLENN L. PIERCE, & JOHN F. MCDEVITT, LEGAL 
HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 139-40 (1984); STUART 
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 140-42 (2002); DAVID 
GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION 172 (2010); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2004).  
 3  See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Capital Punishment, in BEYOND REPAIR?: 
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 121 (Stephen P. Garvey, ed. 2003); see generally 
Symposium, Race to Execution, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1401 (2004); Stephen B. Bright, 
Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discrimination in Infliction 
of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433 (1995); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth 
E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance of Racial Bias in Criminal 
Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509 (1994); Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, 
George Woodworth & Abijah Taylor, Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging 
and Sentencing in North Carolina, 1990-2009, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1997 (2014). 
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official statistics on capital punishment were first issued, and the 
moratorium on executions following Furman v. Georgia in 1972, almost 
half the persons executed for murder and 90% of those executed for rape 
were African American, despite their much lower share of the defendant 
population for each of those crimes and their share of the U.S. population.4 
The constitutional status of racial disparities in capital punishment 
animated the majority concurrences of three of the justices in Furman.5 
Race as a contested jurisprudential factor in death sentencing and 
executions reached a watershed in McCleskey v. Kemp.6 Despite the 
strong evidence submitted by David Baldus and his colleagues7 of 
interracial and intraracial sentencing disparities in McCleskey, the 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, failed to find that these racially skewed 
practices violated either the 8th or 14th Amendments. The McCleskey 
majority opinion, authored by Justice Powell, accepted both the 
methodological premise and the factual interpretation of the evidence, but 
rejected the constitutional claims. Powell argued that only a showing of 
discriminatory purpose would satisfy the evidentiary demands of an Equal 
Protection violation, and that the evidence was insufficient to invalidate 
the Georgia statute as applied under the 8th Amendment.8 In a 
conversation with his biographer, Professor John Jeffries, shortly after 
leaving the bench, Justice Powell later expressed his regrets at having 
written the majority opinion in McCleskey.9 In the years after McCleskey, 
legal scholars have gloomily raised questions based on the Court’s 
reasoning in that opinion about the capacity of courts to redress bias in 
 
 4  See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at n. 11 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 364); see 
also Dennis D. Dorin, Two Different Worlds: Criminologists, Justices, and Racial 
Discrimination in the Imposition of Capital Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1667, 1670 (1981). 
 5  See infra Section II.A. and accompanying notes. 
 6  481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 7  David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of 
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 661, 698-703 (1983). 
 8  See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299-319. 
 9  JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451, 530 (1994) 
(noting how Justice Powell said that given a second chance, he would now join the four 
dissenters in that case and reverse the majority of death sentences in the U.S.). Powell 
went further, saying that “capital punishment should be abolished” (id. at 451); see also 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Change of Mind that Came Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, 
at A23. 
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the criminal justice system.10 In part, the gloom results not just from the 
Court’s demand for a showing of discriminatory purpose, but also by 
making it so hard to prove it in death penalty cases.11 
Both before and after the McCleskey decision, research on racial 
disparities in capital punishment focused attention on charging decisions 
by prosecutors and sentencing decisions by judges and juries, usually 
contingent on prosecutors filing a death notice and following a penalty 
phase trial that resulted in a conviction on the capital murder charge. 
McCleskey, for example, was decided based on the absence of evidence 
of discriminatory intent or purpose by prosecutors. Still, the evidence of 
disparate racial treatment by prosecutors is robust and consistent. Over 50 
studies have shown that Black defendants are more likely than their White 
counterparts to be charged with capital-eligible crimes, to be convicted, 
and to be sentenced to death. Racial disparities in charging and sentencing 
in capital-eligible homicides are largest for the small number of cases 
where Black defendants murder White victims compared to within-race 
killings, or where Whites murder Black or other ethnic minority victims. 
These patterns are robust to rich controls for non-racial characteristics and 
state sentencing guidelines. 
In this article, we argue that the emphasis on prosecutorial 
decisions overlooks a critical stage in the production of death penalty 
cases: police investigations and arrests. Prosecutors select cases for 
capital prosecution from a pool of intentional homicides created 
predominantly through police investigations and arrests. To an extent 
previously unknown, disparities in charging may reflect antecedent racial 
biases in the production of capital-eligible homicides by the police. That 
production process is our focus. Accordingly, we back up the research on 
racial disparities to an earlier stage of capital case processing: the 
production of capital-eligible cases beginning with the identification of 
potential defendants by the police. If police investigations themselves 
produce racial disparities in arrests, then some residual of these disparities 
 
 10  See Reva B. Siegel, Blind Justice: Why the Court Refused to Accept Statistical 
Evidence of Discriminatory Purpose in McCleskey v. Kemp, and Some Pathways for 
Change, 112 NW. U. L.  REV. 1269, 1280-81 (2018) (noting that the Court foresaw “that 
statistical challenges would not be cabined to death, or to race”); John Charles 
Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977-1991, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1637, 
1638 (2018) (noting that Justice Powell erected “all-but-insuperable future barriers 
against statistical proof of discrimination anywhere in the criminal justice system”).   
 11  See Boger, id. at 1638. See, generally, Amsterdam, supra note 1. 
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may skew the investigation and arrests, or clearance, of homicides and in 
particular capital-eligible homicides. Any disparity in which White-
victim homicides are more likely than minority-victim homicides to result 
in arrests suggests inequalities in the administration of justice that may be 
carried forward and expanded in the production of death sentences and 
executions. The answers to these questions go beyond the context of 
capital cases. The racial disparities commonly observed in prosecutorial 
discretion in capital-eligible murders may, to a considerable extent, 
simply reproduce wider racial disparities in police arrests.12 
Accordingly, we ask two simple questions here. First, what 
policing processes contribute to the supply of cases that are then judged 
by prosecutors to be death-eligible? And second, given the racial 
disparities in capital punishment, we then ask if racial biases or disparities 
in investigations infect those processes. There are obvious policy 
implications in the answers to that question, and perhaps constitutional 
questions that raise equal protection worries based on racially selective 
enforcement. Racially skewed processes that create the supply of capital-
eligible cases from the moment of arrest could interact with racially 
skewed discretionary decisions by prosecutors to seek death.13 As a matter 
of policy, understanding the crime, social, and policing conditions that 
shape those policing processes can contribute to equity in public safety 
for this salient subset of cases that often drive public policy and 
perceptions of criminal justice. 
Using data from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports, we 
examine every homicide reported between 1976 and 2009, and find that 
homicides with White victims are significantly more likely to be “cleared” 
by the arrest of a suspect than are homicides with minority victims. We 
estimate a series of hierarchical regressions to show that a substantial 
portion of this disparity is explained by social and demographic 
characteristics of the county in which homicides take place. Most notably, 
counties with large concentrations of minority residents have lower 
clearance rates than do predominantly White counties; however, county 
characteristics do not fully explain the observed race-of-victim 
disparities. We suggest that the police practices that result in the White 
victim disparity in these cases reflect broader inequalities in the 
 
 12  See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
in Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55, 63-65 (2008). 
 13  See generally CAROL STEIKER & JORDAN STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2017). 
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administration of justice. Inequalities in policing, such as the 
underpolicing of the most serious crimes in the most disadvantaged 
communities, coupled with overpolicing of the least serious offenses in 
those same places, seem to extend to the initial stages of the production 
of death sentences and executions. Implicit in this idea is the theory that 
legal processes are influenced by the local ecologies of crime and 
punishment, as well as local social and economic conditions.14  In other 
words, the same processes that lead to disparities in crime may also be 
endogenous to the policing practices that produce wider disparities in 
police contacts and arrests.15 Our findings raise equal protection concerns, 
paving the way for further research into the production of capital 
homicides and the administration of the death penalty. 
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows: The next section 
reviews the empirical evidence on racial disparities in the charging and 
prosecution of capital-eligible homicides. This empirical research on 
racial disparities dates back to the 1930s and continues to the present day. 
It has identified persistent racial disparities, although these disparities take 
different forms based on different combinations of victim and offender 
race or ethnicity. Section III shows the methods and data that are the basis 
of these analyses and conclusions. Section IV presents the results of a 
series of multivariate hierarchical regressions that estimate the 
interactions of victim, offender and case characteristics with the social 
and legal contexts of the places – counties – where these cases originate. 
Implicit in this design is a theory that legal processes are influenced by 
 
 14  See generally DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW (1976); DONALD BLACK, 
THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE (1980); Marian Borg & Karen Parker, 
Mobilizing Law in Urban Areas: The Social Structure of Homicide Clearance Rates, 35 
LAW & SOC. REV. 435 (2001); see also John P. Jarvis & Wendy C. Regoeczi, Murder 
Clearance Rates: Guest Editors’ Introduction, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 79, 79-80 (2007); 
Ashley M. Mancik, Karen F. Parker & Kirk R. Williams, Neighborhood Context and 
Homicide Clearance: Estimating the Effects of Collective Efficacy, 22 HOMICIDE STUD. 
188, 190-92 (2018). 
 15  See David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in 
Arrest, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 55, 63-65 (2008); David S. Kirk & Mauri Matsuda, Legal 
Cynicism, Collective Efficacy, and the Ecology of Arrest, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 443, 457-60 
(2011); David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Cultural Mechanisms and the 
Persistence of Neighborhood Violence, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1190, 1217 (2011); Andrew V. 
Papachristos & David Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 24 (2015); see generally RUTH D. PETERSON, LAUREN J. KRIVO & JOHN HAGAN, 
THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME: INEQUALITIES OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME IN 
AMERICA (2006). 
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the local ecologies of crime and punishment, as well as local social and 
economic conditions.16 The final section locates these results in the 
emerging empirical literature on tensions and distrust between citizens 
and police that may suppress the ability of law enforcement to effectively 
investigate capital-eligible homicides. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Race and the Furman Moratorium 
The 1972 moratorium on executions following Furman v. 
Georgia is often cited as the beginning of the modern era of the American 
death penalty.17 The Furman court invalidated the death sentencing 
regimes of every state and the federal government based, in part, on what 
it described as an arbitrary and capricious pattern of sentencing decisions. 
Race was one of the factors that animated the concerns of some Justices. 
Concurring in the per curiam opinion in Furman, Justice Stewart wrote 
that “if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be 
sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”18 
Justice Douglas cited racial disparities as an example of the English 
proscription against selective use of the death penalty: “it is ‘cruel and 
unusual’ to apply the death penalty . . . selectively to minorities whose 
numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but 
whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance 
general application of the same penalty across the board.”19 Justice Powell 
noted in his dissent that racial disparities were still prevalent at the time 
of Furman, but cited Maxwell v. Bishop20 to stop short of claiming that 
racial bias infected all death sentences imposed on non-White defendants. 
The justices cited research on racial disparities in death sentencing 
to form their claims about race. Justice Douglas cited the conclusions of 
 
 16  See generally BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, supra note 14; Kenneth J. Litwin 
& Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A Multilevel Model 
Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94 (2007); Janice L. Puckett & 
Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a 
More Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 184-86 (2003). 
 17  See, e.g., Steven Shatz and Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with 
Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1227, 1229 (2013). 
 18  408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972).  
 19  Id. at 245. 
 20  398 U.S. 262 (1970).  
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the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice (“Finally, there is evidence that the imposition 
of the death sentence and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts 
and the executive follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is 
disproportionately imposed, and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and 
the members of unpopular groups.”) and research by Professor Hugo 
Bedau (“Although there may be a host of factors other than race involved 
in this frequency distribution, something more than chance has operated 
over the years to produce this racial difference.”). 
Justice Douglas also relied on research by Professor Marvin 
Wolfgang and his colleagues21 that analyzed the outcomes of 439 death 
cases from 1914-1958. Table 3 in the Wolfgang et al. study showed that 
88.4% of death cases with Black defendants resulted in execution 
compared to 79.8% of White defendants, a statistically significant 
difference. The odds ratio in these data of a death sentence for a Black 
defendant compared to a White was 1.93, meaning a Black defendant was 
nearly twice as likely to receive a death sentence as was a White 
defendant. Wolfgang et al. concluded that “..the existence of the 
relationship, although not proving differential bias by race . . . over the 
years since 1914, strongly suggests that such bias has existed.” Wolfgang 
et al. examined felony murders, which (as we describe in this chapter for 
the modern era) were the majority of the murder charges. Here, the 
disparities were most stark: 94 percent of Black felony murder defendants 
were executed, compared to 83 percent of White felony murder 
defendants, an odds ratio of 3.10. The authors added an important 
observation about frequentist statistics that underscores their conclusion 
of systematic bias: 
 
Here, then, is a point at which the lack of statistical significance 
carries an important meaning when placed side by side with a 
relationship that is significant. The fact that Negros on death row 
do not comprise a significantly higher proportion of felony 
murderers than do Whites, combined with the fact that a 
significantly higher proportion of Negro felony murderers are 
executed than are White felony murderers focuses the direction of 
the differential treatment. It is the Negro felony murderer more 
 
 21  See generally Marvin E., Wolfgang, Arlene Kelly & Hans C. Nolde, Comparison of 
the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 301 (1962). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202470 
FAGEN & GELLER FALL 2018 
270 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 23:2 
 
than any other type of offender who will suffer the death penalty. 
(306) 
 
Research published during the 1972-75 Furman moratorium 
confirmed the racial disparities that troubled Justices Stewart, Douglas 
and Marshall. Professors Marvin Wolfgang and Marc Reidel showed that 
Black defendants who killed Whites were at significantly greater risk of 
death in the 1950s and 1960s.22  Their unadjusted data show that 49% of 
defendants executed for murder during that period were Black, and 89% 
of the 455 defendants executed for rape from 1930-1970 were Black.23 
B. Racial Disparities from Furman to McCleskey 
Most of the death penalty states revised their statutes to respond 
to the Court’s critiques. The Supreme Court’s 1975 opinion in Gregg v. 
Georgia reinstated capital punishment and set standards for 
proportionality review, and procedural standards for constitutional 
compliance.24 Gregg’s hyper-proceduralization of death sentencing was 
designed to reduce arbitrariness and racial disparities in capital 
punishment. Still, those concerns remained once death sentences and 
executions resumed, and they increased starting in the late 1970s. 
Not until McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987 did evidence of racial 
discrimination in charging and sentencing in capital cases reach the post-
Furman Supreme Court.25 The evidence presented in McCleskey 
elaborated on the evidence cited in Furman. In the runup to McCleskey, 
Baldus and Woodworth showed that a Black defendant accused of killing 
a White victim (BD-WV) in Georgia was 3.1 times more likely to be 
 
 22  See Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death 
Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 119, 123 (1973); Marvin E. Wolfgang 
& Marc Reidel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 662 (1975). 
 23  See Catherine M. Grosso, Barbara O’Brien, Abijah Taylor & George Woodworth, 
Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL 
SANCTION 540 (James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014).  
 24  428 US 153 (1976). Two other opinions were issued the same day as Gregg that 
further elaborated on constitutional standards. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 42 U.S. 
153 (1976) (establishing the “death is different” doctrine that requires distinction of 
capital-eligible murders from ‘ordinary’ murders); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
(holding that the death penalty for rape of an adult woman was grossly disproportionate 
and excessive punishment and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).  
 25  See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 299-319.  
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sentenced to death than any defendant accused of killing a Black victim 
(BV) in the years immediately after Gregg.26 Baldus and Woodworth also 
showed that the disparities were not uniform across cases of varying 
severity of aggravation in the murder. Disparities were greatest in the mid-
range of aggravation severity, where charging discretion was greatest. 
The evidence was introduced at trial in McCleskey, but was 
unpersuasive to the McCleskey majority at the Supreme Court. Despite 
the findings of the Baldus study (later confirmed in a 1990 General 
Accounting Office review27), the Court affirmed McCleskey’s death 
sentence. The majority adopted a standard of discriminatory purpose, 
citing Washington v. Davis (1976).28 Warren McCleskey’s death sentence 
was affirmed by the Court, despite the Court's acceptance of the evidence 
of discrimination in death charging and sentencing in Georgia in the years 
before McCleskey’s trial and sentencing. 
Perhaps the McCleskey Court lacked a more detailed elaboration 
of the evidence. The 1990 GAO review included a study by Baldus et al. 
examining racial disparities in 2,400 capital-eligible cases from 1973-
1980.29 That period spanned the Furman moratorium and the Gregg 
holding that created the basic architecture of the current death penalty 
jurisprudence. Together with the 1983 article, this evidence was the basis 
for Warren McCleskey’s claim of racial discrimination charging and 
death sentencing in Georgia. These studies showed that defendants 
accused of murdering White victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive 
a death sentence than a similarly situated defendant whose victims were 
Black.30 
But it is unlikely that the additional evidence would have 
 
 26  Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 7, at 709. The study showed both BD-WV 
disparities and BD disparities regardless of victim race in Georgia in the decade preceding 
the Furman moratorium. The Gregg architecture seems to have failed to curb racial 
discrimination in charging, notably in Georgia where Furman, Gregg and McCleskey 
originated. 
 27  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFF., 101ST CONG., GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY 
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN DISPARITIES (1990). 
 28  426 U.S. 229, 230 (holding that an official act is not unconstitutional solely because 
it has a racially discriminatory impact regardless of discriminatory intent). 
 29  DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH, AND CHARLES A. PULASKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 
AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 2-4 (1990) (reporting 
evidence of statistical discrimination in the selection of cases for capital prosecution in 
the period between the Furman and Gregg decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 30  Id. at 4. The GAO study, citing Baldus and Woodworth (1990) and other studies, 
found the evidence at that time of bias based on race of defendants to be equivocal.  
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mattered. Explaining his position in a memo to Justice Marshall, Justice 
Scalia drew a distinction between purposeful discrimination toward a 
defendant and the “unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and 
antipathies” that would produce discrimination.31 Justice Powell’s 
majority opinion superficially accepted McCleskey’s detailed, rigorous 
and unrebutted evidence of racial discrimination, but “appears to have 
contorted the Court’s prior Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, erecting all-but-insuperable future barriers against 
statistical proof of racial discrimination anywhere within the criminal 
justice system.”32 The Court at that time simply was hostile to social 
science and statistical evidence of discrimination in death sentencing.33 
Professor Boger finds the hostility emerging a year earlier in Lockhart v. 
McCree,34 where Chief Justice Burger was reported to claim in conference 
that he was “not going to be ‘bossed around’ by social scientists.”35 
These setbacks failed to deter other researchers from adding to the 
empirical evidence of race discrimination in the selection of death-eligible 
cases for prosecution. Studies after McCleskey through the late 1980s 
elaborated on the disparities cited both by the Furman court and by Baldus 
et al.36 The 1990 GAO systematic review – an “evaluative synthesis” of 
research on racial disparities in post-Furman death sentencing and 
 
 31  Memorandum from Antonin Scalia to the Conference Re: No. 84 6811, McCleskey v. 
Kemp (from Thurgood Marshall Papers) (Jan. 6, 1987). 
 32  Boger, supra note 10, at 1638. 
 33  See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1280.  Justice Powell disguised his hostility to social 
science as a policy argument: “Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice 
process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the 
discretion has been abused False Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly 
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case 
acted with discriminatory purpose.” McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297. But Powell’s interest 
went further to shut down empirical claims of discrimination in criminal justice matters: 
“. . . if we accepted McCleskey’s claim . . . we could soon be faced with similar claims 
as to other types of penalty” and he foresaw claims based on “unexplained discrepancies 
that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.” McCleskey, 
481 U.S. at 315-17. 
 34  See Boger, supra note 10, at 1672-73 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 
(1986)). 
 35  The McCree Court rejected a robust body of experimental evidence showing that 
excluding jurors opposed to the death penalty at the guilt phase biased deliberations at 
the penalty phase toward the state’s view. See id. at 1671-72 (citing EDWARD LAZARUS, 
CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE 
THE SUPREME COURT 189 (1998)). 
 36  See Grosso et al., supra note 23, at 525-77. 
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executions – reported consistent evidence of a race-of-victim (RV) 
disparity: 82% of the studies they reviewed reported that defendants who 
murdered Whites were significantly more likely to be sentenced to death. 
The effect was observed at all stages of the criminal justice system, 
beginning with the charging decision and continuing through plea 
bargaining and sentencing. The GAO was more equivocal on race-of-
defendant (RD) evidence. On average, there was a RD effect, but it varied 
by study features. As an aside, the studies didn’t examine disparities in 
arrests for death-eligible murders, the focus of this chapter, leaving open 
questions about the mechanisms and racial disparities in the production of 
capital cases. 
C. Racial Disparities After McCleskey 
Several post-McCleskey cases were included in the 1990 GAO 
“evaluative synthesis,” demonstrating that racial disparities were not 
uncommon beyond the 1983 Baldus and Woodworth study. Grosso et al. 
reviewed 36 post-1990 studies on racial disparities in charging and 
sentencing.37 They observed the same patterns that were reported by the 
GAO. They reported race-of-victim effects in 24 studies across 13 states 
and in the U.S. Armed Forces. A mandated proportionality review by the 
Administrative Office of the Court in New Jersey also reported no race 
effects, but only after excluding the influence of county factors.38 Studies 
in North Carolina and Tennessee reached the same conclusions.39 Four 
other studies showed race of defendant effects, without assessing any 
concurrent race of victim effects, including an earlier federal death 
penalty study40 and the Baldus et al. of the death penalty in the U.S. 
Armed Forces.41  Four studies, including a 2006 analysis of federal death 
penalty cases, showed no race effects.42 A mandated proportionality 
 
 37  See id. at Appendix A. 
 38  DAVID BAIME, NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMISSION: REPORT TO THE NEW 
JERSEY SUPREME COURT SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT (2001), 
available at https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/baimereport.pdf.  
 39  See Grosso et al., supra note 23, at 525-77.  
 40  U.S. Department of Justice, Survey of the Federal Death Penalty System (1988-2000) 
(2000). U.S. Department of Justice (2001) Survey of the Federal Death Penalty System: 
Supplementary Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review (2001). 
 41  See David Baldus, Catherine Grosso, George Woodworth & Rebecca Newell, Racial 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United 
States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J.  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1227-1336 
(2012). 
 42  See, STEPHEN KLEIN, RICHARD BERK, AND LAURA HICKMAN, RACE AND 
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review by the Administrative Office of the Court in New Jersey also 
reported no race effects. Studies in North Carolina and Tennessee reached 
the same conclusions. 
Race of victim effects were shown in 24 studies in 13 states and 
in the U.S. Armed Forces.43  Not only are race effects identified in WV 
cases as well as BD/WV cases, but at least one study showed that BD/BV 
cases actually “pull strongly in the opposite direction.”44  O’Brien et al. 
show that clearance rates for BD/BV cases are 2.6 times lower than for all 
other victim race/ defendant race combinations, and that juries were 
nearly 80% less likely to impose death sentences in the few WD/BV 
cases.45 
In addition to the state studies, a few studies identified race of 
victim (RV) effects in multi-jurisdictional (states) studies, while others 
identified the same effects in county-level or State sub-region studies. 
Others either found no race effects or challenged earlier studies showing 
race effects. Paternoster found the same in South Carolina46 and again 
(with colleagues) in Maryland.47 Professors Berk and Hickman re-
analyzed Maryland data using alternate methods to conclude that race 
differences, whether by victim or offender race, were marginal to non-
existent, after controlling for the influence of race-correlated factors.48 
However, Professor Sherrod Thaxton found race of victim (RV) effects in 
Georgia capital punishment data from 1994-2005 after using race-specific 
 
THE DECISION TO SEEK THE DEATH PENALTY IN FEDERAL CASES (2006) at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR389. 
 43  See Grosso et al., supra note 23, at 538 (citing David Baldus, Catherine Grosso, 
George Woodworth, and Richard. Newell, Racial Discrimination in the Administration 
of the Death Penalty: The Experience of the United States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1228 (2012)). 
 44  Barbara O’Brien, Catherine M. Grosso, George Woodworth, & Abijah Taylor, 
Untangling the Role of Race in Capital Charging and Sentencing in North Carolina, 
1990-2009, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2016). 
 45  Id. 
 46  Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek 
the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).  
 47  Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Sarah Bacon, & Andrew Ditchfield, Justice by 
geography and race: The administration of the death penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 
U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1 (2004). 
 48  Richar A. Berk, and Matthew L. Hickman, Statistical Difficulties in Determining the 
Role of Race in Capital Cases: A Re-Analysis of Data From the State of Maryland, 20 J. 
Quantitative Criminology 365, 365-67 (2005). 
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models in response to the analytic concerns cited by Berk and Hickman.49 
The 2017 Pennsylvania capital punishment commission study found 
neither race of victim nor race of defendant effects across the state, but 
reported large disparities in both race of victim and race of defendant 
effects in charging and sentencing when disaggregated by county.50 
The most recent study, by Professor Glenn Pierce and colleagues, 
showed significant race of victim (RV) effects in Oklahoma in capital-
eligible cases but no race of defendant effects in cases from 1990-2012.51 
This study also showed strong interactions between victim race and victim 
gender, with female and White victim homicides resulting in death 
sentences anywhere from 3.22 times to 8.68 times more likely than for 
male or non-White victims. Defendant’s race (RD) by itself did not 
correlate with the likelihood of a death sentence, the probability of a death 
sentence for a nonWhite defendant charged with killing a White victim 
(5.8%) was more than triple the probability of a death sentence for a White 
defendant charged with killing a non-White victim (1.8%).52 
D. The Production of Capital Homicides 
None of the past studies on disparities in capital murder cases 
questioned whether there was bias at the source: the production of capital 
homicides through police investigations and arrests. Nearly all the studies 
of racial disparities in capital punishment begin their analysis at the point 
of prosecutorial charging decisions. These analyses begin with a docket 
of cases presented to prosecutors or courts to determine whether to charge 
them as first or second degree murder, and then, to determine death 
eligibility. Some studies use data on murder rates by race of defendant or 
victim as external benchmarks to assess racial disparities in charging and 
sentencing, but those are exceptions.53 Others simply look at the pool of 
 
 49  Sherod Thaxton, Disentangling Disparity: Exploring Racially Disparate Effect and 
Treatment in Capital Charging, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2018). 
 50  See JOHN KRAMER, JEFFERY ULMER & GARY ZAJAC, REPORT TO PENNSYLVANIA 
INTERBRANCH COMMISSION FOR GENDER, RACIAL AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT DECISIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA: 2000-2010 IMPLICATIONS FOR RACIAL, 
ETHNIC AND OTHER DISPARATE IMPACTS (2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3148037. 
 51  See Glenn L. Pierce, Michael L. Radelet & Susan Sharp, Race and Death Sentencing 
for Oklahoma Homicides Committed Between 1990 and 2012, 107 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 733, 746-50 (2017). 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id.  
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cases and use internal benchmarks to identify differences by race or 
ethnicity during the selection process. None begin with the entire pool of 
murders to identify selection processes at the source of the pool of 
potential eligibles: police arrest decisions.54 
Accordingly, we ask a simple question here: what policing 
processes create the supply of cases that are judged by prosecutors to be 
death-eligible? Given the racial disparities in capital punishment, we next 
ask if racial biases or disparities in investigations infect those processes. 
There are obvious policy implications in the answers to that question, and 
perhaps equal protection concerns based on racially selective 
enforcement. If the processes by which a supply of capital cases is 
produced via arrest from the overall supply of murders are racially 
skewed, this could suggest mechanisms that would influence the racial 
makeup of the subset of cases eligible for capital prosecution, and could 
interact with discretionary decisions of prosecutors to seek death.55As a 
matter of policy, understanding the crime, social and policing conditions 
that shape those processes can contribute to equity in public safety for the 
subset of cases that often drive public policy and perceptions of criminal 
justice. 
1. Homicide Clearance Rates 
Police clearance rates – the percentage of known crimes that result 
in an arrest of a suspected offender – are central to this question. The 
 
 54  See, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2015) (redefining a selective 
prosecution case as a selective enforcement case based on the role of law enforcement in 
assembling the pool of potentially eligible suspects: “If the initial inquiry gives the judge 
reason to think that suspects of another race, and otherwise similarly situated, would not 
have been offered the opportunity for a [fake robbery opportunity], it might be 
appropriate to require [law enforcement] to disclose, in confidence, their criteria for [the 
fake conspiracies.] Analysis of the targeting criteria (and whether agents followed those 
rules in practice) could shed light on whether an initial suspicion of race discrimination 
in this case is justified. . . If after that inquiry the judge continues to think that racial 
discrimination may have led to this prosecution, more information could be gathered”). 
 55  See also Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial 
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 
(2013) (analyzing racial disparities in prosecutorial decision-making empirically); see 
also BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, TECHNICAL REPORT: 
PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY (2014), available at  
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/race-and-
prosecution-in-manhattan/legacy_downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-
technical.pdf. 
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police produce a supply of capital-eligible and other murder cases by 
“clearing” homicides via arrest. However, the ability of police officers to 
clear a given homicide case is multiply determined, not only by the 
complexity of the homicide itself, but by institutional and political factors 
that may enhance or undermine police department efficiency. 
While clearance rates provide an objective measure of police 
performance, empirical studies of clearance rates across police agencies 
and within them over time suggest that clearance rates may be picking up 
noise about the police organization in addition to the skills of 
investigators. For example, some researchers challenge the value of using 
police clearance rates as a measure of police effectiveness, claiming 
invariance in homicide rates despite changes in workload or personnel.56 
Factors such as the policing model, resource allocation, personnel 
assignments, management mechanisms such as merit systems, 
investigative tactics, information systems, and inter-agency cooperation 
can all influence clearance rates.57 In Ghettoside, for example, Jill Leovy 
describes the difficulties in completing homicide investigations in the 
poorer areas of Los Angeles with higher homicide rates, where 
investigations are complicated by lower staffing and the self-selection of 
more experienced detectives to work in more visible and politically 
glamorous divisions that investigate higher profile cases.58 Other 
researchers challenge the claim that workload and staffing levels impact 
police clearance rates, claiming invariance in homicide clearance rates 
despite changes in workload or personnel allocations.59 However, all 
these studies leave open the question of how officer skillsets and 
experience, or perhaps institutional or agency preferences, may affect 
clearance rates.  
Much of what we know about police clearance rates is based on 
arrests for violent crimes in large cities.60 That may not help us theorize 
 
 56  See, e.g., Graham Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in 
Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980–2000, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 141 (2009). 
 57  See Timothy G. Keel, John P. Jarvis & Yvonne E. Muirhead, An Exploratory Analysis 
of Factors Affecting Homicide Investigations: Examining the Dynamics of Murder 
Clearance Rates, 13 HOMICIDE STUD. 50 (2009); Arianna Ornaghi, Essays in Political 
Economy, M.I.T., DEPT. OF ECON. (2017), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113994. 
 58  See JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA (2015). 
 59  See Ousey & Lee, supra note 57, at 150. 
 60  See, e.g., Borg & Parker, supra note 14, at 435, 458; Jeffrey J. Roth, Property Crime 
Clearance in Small Jurisdictions: Police and Community Factors, 43 CRIM. JUST. REV. 
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what policing factors matter for capital-eligible homicides. Although 
homicides are concentrated in urban areas, there is no reason to suspect 
that capital-eligible homicides are clustered disproportionately in those 
areas.61 In fact, these cases appear well beyond cities as well as within 
them. For example, the Atlanta Journal Constitution reported in its series 
on capital punishment in Georgia that death sentences were sought in all 
49 of Georgia’s judicial districts between 1995 and 2004, resulting in 29 
death sentences that also were spread out across the state.62 And as 
discussed earlier, Professor Raymond Paternoster found the same in South 
Carolina63 and (with colleagues) in Maryland.64 
The few studies of error rates in death penalty convictions show 
much the same spread, with cases spread across counties both urban and 
rural in both densely and sparsely populated states.65 Despite the spatial 
spread in homicides, extralegal factors in both large and small places 
influence error rates. These extralegal factors include: homicide rates, 
poor clearance rates, racial composition of both murders and the local 
area, and overloaded and inefficient criminal justice systems.66 This 
spatial spread in capital-eligible prosecutions, and the patterns of 
clearance rates for homicides, suggests the need for extensions of the 
theories of social disorganization in urban settings that have been 
dominant in studies of homicides and their clearance rates. 
Three lessons thread through the studies of homicide clearance 
rates with implications for explaining clearance rates of capital-eligible 
homicides. First, extralegal factors that explain homicide clearance rates 
generally – especially victim race or ethnicity – may differ from the 
 
477, 478 (2018). 
 61  See Robert J. Sampson, Race and Criminal Violence: A Demographically 
Disaggregated Analysis of Urban Homicide, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 47, 63 (1985). 
 62  See Bill Rankin, Heather Vogell, Sonji Jacobs & Megan Clarke, A Matter of Life and 
Death: Death Still Arbitrary, ATL. J. CONSTIT., Sept. 23, 2007, 
https://www.myajc.com/news/state—regional/from-2007-matter-life-and-death-death-
still-arbitrary/uQMik03eSLJ7VlI4wvUZnN/. 
 63  See Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to 
Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983). 
 64  See generally Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Sarah Bacon & Andrew 
Ditchfield, Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in 
Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1 (2004). 
 65  See, e.g., Andrew Gelman, James S. Liebman, Valerie West & Alexander Kiss, A 
Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United 
States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004). 
 66  See id. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202470 
ISSUE 23:3 FALL 2018 
2018 POLICE, RACE, AND HOMICIDE 279 
 
extralegal factors that explain clearance rates in other types of cases – 
specifically, offender race.67 This leads us to focus on victim race as well 
as defendant race, consistent with the evidence on racial disparities in 
death penalty prosecutions and sentences. Second, clearance rates are 
subject to extralegal contextual influences: the racial composition of 
homicides and of the place where homicides take place, rates of poverty 
and inequality, segregation and stratification, and other correlates of 
homicide and other violent crimes.68 Again, whether these factors apply 
to capital-eligible cases, a distinct subset of homicides, is the question for 
this project. Third, the heterogeneity of homicide, from gang conflicts to 
felony murders to intimate partner homicides to drug transactions gone 
awry, suggests that police will be challenged to achieve consistent and 
equitable clearance rates across these categories. Victim cooperation is 
likely to vary. 
2. Variation in Homicide Clearance Rates 
Long-term trends show that police have had increasing difficulty 
in clearing homicides. Homicide clearance rates have declined from 95% 
in 1951, a lower crime era, to 60% in 2012,69 two decades after the peak 
homicide rate in the U.S. in 1991.70 From 1961, three decades of 
cascading homicide rates ensued, with spikes in 1972, 1981, and 1991 that 
each suggested a pattern of a disease epidemic.71 The surge in homicides, 
 
 67  See generally Catherine Y. Lee, The Value of Life: Multiple Regression and Event 
History Analyses of Homicide Clearance in Los Angeles County, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 527 
(2005). 
 68  See, e.g., Marian J. Borg & Karen F. Parker, Mobilizing Law in Urban Areas: The 
Social Structure of Homicide Clearance Rates, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 435 (2001); 
Kenneth J. Litwin & Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A Multilevel 
Model Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94 (2007); Janice L. 
Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate 
Analysis of a Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (2003); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An 
Abolitionist Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 262 (2007). 
 69  See Paul A. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty 
Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 
B.U.L. REV. 687, 709 (at Fig. 2). 
 70  See RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 466 (2012).  
 71  See Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & June Kim, Declining Homicide in New 
York: A Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1307 (1998); ROTH, 
supra note 71, at 463-66; Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social 
Contagion of Violence, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 688, 694-
95 (Daniel Flannery, Alexander Vazsonyi & Irwin Waldman eds., 2007). 
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especially in urban areas, may be one of several factors that influenced 
the decline, with strains on police resources simply exceeding the 
investigatory bandwidth of many agencies. Aki Roberts reports that 
firearm homicides have the lowest clearance rates compared to other 
homicide types, and that police workload also suppresses clearance 
rates.72 These trends suggest that the cascading epidemics of gun 
homicides have in fact reduced clearance rates. 
Still, even within this declining rate, we suggest that other factors 
may also contribute to the difficulty in homicide clearance. Two 
competing theories posit how police investigation of homicides might 
vary by victim characteristics.73 Professor Black notes unequal 
application of the law by “vertical location,” suggesting that offenses 
against upper-status individuals receive more legal attention (either 
criminal or civil) than offenses against lower-status individuals.74 
Historically this stratification has operated across a variety of dimensions 
– wealth, social class, gender, and perhaps most notably, race. Professor 
Nick Peterson shows that homicides in predominantly Black and Latino 
neighborhoods are less likely to be cleared.75 He goes on to suggest that 
these area demographics may exert larger effects than victim race in 
explaining the neighborhood context of homicide clearance. At the least, 
victim race, a critical factor in capital-eligible homicide charging 
disparities, seems to interact with neighborhood structure to shape 
clearance rates and in turn, the supply of capital-eligible cases. 
Others posit instead that the law is applied based solely on the 
extent of harm suffered by the victim at the hands of the offender, and that 
demographic or socioeconomic disparities in clearance or other legal 
responses are driven primarily by systematic differences in crimes against 
different social groups whose variable social organization poses uneven 
 
 72  See generally Aki Roberts, Adjusting Rates of Homicide Clearance by Arrest for 
Investigation Difficulty: Modeling Incident- and Jurisdiction-Level Obstacles, 19 
HOMICIDE STUD. 273, 275, 284 (2015); see also Litwin & Xu, supra note 69; Janice L. 
Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate 
Analysis of a Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 171-
93.  
 73  See Roberts, supra note 69; Litwin & Xu, supra note 69; Puckett & Lundman, supra 
note 69. 
 74  BLACK, supra note 16, at 16-21; see also Borg & Parker, supra note 14. 
 75  Nick Peterson, Neighborhood Context and Unsolved Murders: The Social Ecology of 
Homicide Investigations, 27 POLICING & SOC’Y 372 (2017). 
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challenges in clearing homicide cases.76 For example, Regoeczi et al. posit 
that female-victim homicides are likely to be cleared more quickly than 
male-victim homicides, primarily because women are more likely to be 
killed by an intimate partner.77 Felony murders, in contrast, are less likely 
to be cleared since there is no victim-offender relationship on which 
investigators can build a case. Similarly, they suggest that homicides of 
children may have higher clearance rates because children are more likely 
than other homicide victims to be killed by somebody they know. 
Professor Roberts shows that homicides of a family member or friend are 
far more likely to be cleared by arrest than homicides of strangers or 
murders where the victim-offender relationship is unknown. Relatedly, 
she demonstrates that gun killings are less likely to be cleared by arrest.78 
Homicide clearance rates are also influenced by the presence of 
and cooperation from witnesses and others who know the neighborhood 
and circumstances of a murder.79 Witness and neighborhood cooperation 
generally covaries with pre-existing relationships between the police and 
local residents or merchants. In neighborhoods that are saturated with 
police and where policing is aggressive, cooperation with police tends to 
be constrained because neighborhood residents see the police as unfair, 
disrespectful, and illegal.80 
 
 76  See, e.g., Michael Gottfredson & Michael J. Hindelang, A Study of the Behavior of 
the Law, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 3, 15-16 (1979). 
 77  See Wendy C. Regoeczi & John P. Jarvis, Beyond the Social Production of Homicide 
Rates: Extending Social Disorganization Theory to Explain Homicide Case Outcomes, 
30 JUST. Q. 983-1014 (2013). 
 78  Roberts, supra note 69, at 284. 
 79  See CHARLES WELLFORD & JAMES CRONIN, AN ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES AFFECTING 
THE CLEARANCE OF HOMICIDES: A MULTISTATE STUDY (1999), available at 
http://www.jrsa.org/pubs/reports/homicides_report.pdf; see generally Patrick J. Carr, 
Laura Napolitano, & Jessica Keating, We Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: A 
Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods, 45 
CRIMINOLOGY 445, 450-51 (2007); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL 
INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2009). 
 80  See generally Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Street Stops and Police 
Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751-85 (2014); Jeffrey Fagan, Tom R. Tyler, & Tracey L. 
Meares, Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York, Comparing the Democratic 
Governance of Police Intelligence (Jacqueline E. Ross & Thierry Delpeuch, eds., 2016), 
203-31; RICK TRINKNER & TOM R. TYLER, WHY CHILDREN FOLLOW RULES: LEGAL 
SOCIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMACY (2018); Mark T. Berg, Eric A. 
Stewart, Jonathan Intravia, Patricia Y. Warren & Ronald L. Simons, Cynical Streets: 
Neighborhood Social Processes and Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 
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That style of policing tends to take place in neighborhoods with 
higher crime rates, yet there also is evidence that race effects in police 
cooperation extend beyond race-crime correlations.81 For example, 
clearance rates are lower in neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
economic disadvantage, residential instability, Black and Hispanic 
concentrations, and high unemployment rates - homicide rates 
notwithstanding.82 In contrast, cohesion among neighbors seems to 
improve homicide clearance rates net of the homicide rate.83 In other 
words, homicide clearance seems to covary with both structural and social 
organizational features of neighborhoods, as well as with the ties between 
residents and police. 
Aki Roberts concluded that “homicide arrest clearance is greatly 
affected by factors beyond police control, such as situational 
characteristics of homicide incidents, jurisdictional characteristics that 
affect citizen cooperation, and police agency workload.”84 But clearance 
rates may also be affected by factors within the control of police 
departments. Regoeczi and Jarvis’ study of Cleveland police data found 
that witness cooperation interacted with community characteristics in 
predicting clearance, so that the presence of a witness increased clearance 
likelihood only in communities with low levels of social 
disorganization.85 But if cooperation is withheld in heavily policed 
neighborhoods, then clearance rates in the most disadvantaged and 
highest crime areas are likely to be lower.86 
Peterson points out that race is implicated in lower cooperation 
rates in homicide investigations.87 But the question for us is how. Lower 
cooperation rates reflect alienation from the police, often in response to 
 
520 (2016); Monica C. Bell, Situational Trust: How Disadvantaged Mothers Reconceive 
Legal Cynicism, 50 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 314, 315-18, 338 (2016). 
 81  See, e.g., VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 
(2011); NIKKI JONES, ‘THE REGULAR ROUTINE’: PROACTIVE POLICING AND ADOLESCENT 
DEVELOPMENT AMONG YOUNG, POOR BLACK MEN: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND 
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (2014); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, 
VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999). 
 82  See Peterson, supra note 76. 
 83  See Mancik et al., supra note 14.  
 84  See Roberts, supra note 69, at 292. 
 85  See Regoeczi & Jarvis, supra note 78. 
 86  See Tom R. Tyler, Phillip Atiba Goff, & Robert J. MacCoun, The Impact of 
Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, 
and Effective Law Enforcement, 16 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 75, 80-86 (2015). 
 87  Peterson, supra note 76. 
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incidents of police violence. Professor Desmond and his colleagues 
showed sharp declines in 911 reports in Milwaukee following a police 
shooting of an unarmed Black citizen.88 Those events seem to churn what 
is a reservoir of discontent that distances citizens from police, and it 
happens particularly when they are most needed. It is worrisome that the 
same neighborhood conditions that elevate murder and other violent 
crime rates seem to also reduce citizen cooperation with police, a 
problematic intersection that compounds each of these processes.89 When 
homicides remain unsolved, the killer is free to kill again, compounding 
the alienation from police and skewing the racial distribution of homicide 
clearance rates. 
Several processes, then, combine to create and shape the supply 
of capital cases. These dynamics churn both in institutions and 
communities, and provide a new perspective on the robust racial disparity 
in death penalty charging and sentencing. The effectiveness of police in 
clearing homicides creates the front-end of a supply of cases eligible for 
prosecution, which instantiates the racial distribution that is presented to 
prosecutors, who then exercise their own discretion that carries forward 
(if not expands) racial disparities.90 Quite simply, police receive less help 
from citizens in neighborhoods with high Black homicide victimization 
rates. The clearance rate – the gate in this process – is shaped in part by 
differences in the relationships of police with communities of color, 
which impacts those communities' willingness to cooperate in criminal 
investigations.91 These relationships also effect the estrangement many 
communities of color have generally from the agents of formal (legal) 
social control over their lives.92 While these tensions have been observed 
 
 88  See Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence 
and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857-76 (2016). 
 89  See LEOVY, supra note 59, at 74-81; Benjamin Mueller Mueller & Al Baker, Rift 
Between Officers and Residents as Killings Persist in South Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 
2016), http://nyti.ms/2jVye66. 
 90  See Baldus et al., supra note 7; Catherine Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn 
Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson 
North Carolina Capital Trials, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1548-55 (2012); Sonja B. Starr & 
M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of 
Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013) 
 91  See Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel Richman, Understanding Recent Spikes and Longer 
Trends in American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1235 (2017). 
 92  See Bell, supra note 81, at 315; Charis Kubrin & Ronald Weitzer, New Directions in 
Social Disorganization Theory, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 374, 382-84 (2003). 
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broadly in cities such as Los Angeles,93 Chicago,94 and New York,95 their 
effects on the supply of capital cases are not well understood. We address 
that question in this analysis. 
E. This Article 
This article provides a first glimpse at the flow of cases and 
examines the factors that may explain the persistence of racial 
lopsidedness in capital charging. We combine and analyze data on capital-
eligible homicides from 1976-2009 to address three issues. First, we 
estimate the extent of racial disparities in clearance rates for capital-
eligible homicides. This requires, as a predicate step, that we identify the 
subset of homicides that are capital-eligible. While there are numerous 
studies on racial disparity in charging and sentencing, there are almost 
none that identify the universe of capital-eligible cases from which 
prosecutor select cases for capital prosecution. It is this supply function 
that is the focus of this paper. In keeping with the limited prior work on 
this question, we examine disparities by both victim and offender race. 
Second, we identify state and county factors that predict and 
explain these differentials. There is a long tradition in both law and 
criminology of looking to social structural factors, especially racial 
composition of communities and local crime conditions, to explain racial 
disparity in sentencing.96 However, only a few studies have asked whether 
 
 93  See generally LEOVY, supra note 59.  
 94  See generally, CITY OF CHICAGO, MAYOR’S POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE (2016), available at 
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-
1.pdf. 
 95  See, e.g., Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, A Shooting, The Hospital, and Months Later, 
A Homicide, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2018), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/nyregion/murder-in-the-40-south-bronx-
shooting.html; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do 
People Help the Police Fight Crime in their Communities? 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 
244-45 (2008). 
 96  See also David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: 
Evidence from the US Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285 (2001); Brian D. Johnson, 
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Sentencing Departures Across Modes of Conviction, 41 
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (2003); Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial 
Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion 
and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729 (2012); Kyle Rozema & 
Max M. Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad Cop: An Analysis of Chicago Civilian 
Allegations of Police Misconduct (U. Chicago, Working Paper 2016), available at 
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these factors specifically influence rates of capital sentencing.97 In this 
study, we examine these factors as they interact with the earliest stage in 
this process: police investigation and arrest of homicide suspects. This is 
a particularly sensitive step in creating the supply of capital-eligible 
defendants, since we are now aware—compared, for example, to the era 
of the McCleskey opinion—of the fault lines in police investigations that 
can lead to error rates and wrongful convictions.98 
Third, we estimate the effect of the presence of a valid death 
statute on the clearance rates of capital-eligible homicides. The presence 
of a death statute could incentivize police to clear capital-eligible cases 
more so than ordinary homicides. Community pressures, even if variable 
from one community to the next, provide a political incentive to call 
offenders in high-visibility crimes to account. Where police and other 
political actors express a preference for harsher punishment, creating a 
flow of capital-eligible cases satisfies important constituencies. In 
instances where the justice system may be weak or inefficient, the 
production of a salient capital-eligible case can shift the community and 
political perspective of the police from their inadequacies to their 
heroism. In studying mistakes or reversal in capital cases, Professor 
Gelman and colleagues observed that such inefficiencies can lead to high 
error rates.99 Here, we estimate whether the robust racial disparities in 
eligibility and death sentencing can be explained in part by the incentives 
to the police of the presence of a death capital-eligible cases. 
 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2866696.  
 97  Jeffrey Fagan & Raymond Paternoster, Address at Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of Criminology: Social Context and Proportionality of Capital Punishment in 
Georgia after McCleskey (Nov. 17, 2010). For a review, see Sherod Thaxton, 
Disentangling Disparity, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 98  James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Garth Davies, A Broken System: 
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, (Colum. L. School, Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 15, 
2000); James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Andrew Gelman, Valerie West, Garth Davies, 
& Alexander Kiss, A Broken System, Part II: Why There is So Much Error in Capital 
Cases, and What Can Be Done About It (Colum. L. School, 2010), available at 
www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/; Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need 
for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 
HOUSTON L.  REV. 1281-1318 (2004). 
 99  See also Andrew Gelman, James S. Liebman, Valerie West & Alexander Kiss, A 
Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United 
States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 224, 240-241 (at Table 2) (2004); see also, 
James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd, Capital Attrition: 
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202470 
FAGEN & GELLER FALL 2018 
286 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 23:2 
 
The remainder of this essay proceeds in four sections. First, we 
describe the methods to assemble the database. This includes the creation 
of a classification model to identify which homicides are potentially 
capital-eligible in a universe of cases where many of the statutory 
aggravators that make a case capital-eligible are only partially measured. 
Next, we describe the data sources and measures from which we address 
the three issues for this chapter. The results are discussed next. We 
conclude with a discussion of the implications and importance of bringing 
police into our understanding of capital punishment, and of what this may 
mean for its jurisprudence. 
METHODS 
A. Data 
1. Homicides 
We analyze homicide data from the Supplementary Homicide 
Reports (SHR), part of the Uniform Crime Reports produced annually by 
the U.S. Department of Justice, from 1976-2009.100 Case reports are 
submitted by law enforcement agencies using a standardized coding 
format. The SHR includes files organized at the incident level, the victim 
level, and the offender level. We focus on incident-level data in order to 
provide a more precise estimate of incident clearance rates. Homicides are 
reported in the SHR along with the state and county in which they take 
place, along with their reporting agency (also known as ORI).101 We use 
a recent update of the SHR dataset that expands in two ways on the 
archived data.102 First, data is included for states such as Florida that 
previously had not participated in the SHR reporting program. Second, 
multiple imputation methods are used to adjust for missing data from the 
archived files.103 
 
 100  U.S. DEPT. JUST., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS, 
available at https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/addendum-for-submitting-cargo-theft-data/shr. 
 101  ORIs, in turn, match states and counties to their Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) codes using the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk 
(National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, 2005), which permit states and counties to 
be associated with Census data and data from other Federal datasets. Homicides are, 
accordingly, matched to Census population and socioeconomic data on the counties in 
which they take place, interpolated for intra-census years. 
 102  James Alan Fox & Emma E. Fridel, Supplementary Homicide Reports, Multiply-
Imputed Database, 1976-2016 Cumulative File (Northeastern U. 2017). 
 103  See, e.g., Jonathan A.C. Sterne et al., Multiple Imputation for Missing Data in 
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From 1976-2016, the SHR file include 613,602 homicides. We 
report on the rate of capital eligibility for that period, by type of homicide. 
However, we report detailed information on clearance rates for a shorter 
period from 1976-2009. We use the shorter period due to the availability 
of census data on county characteristics for that period. In the 1976-2009 
period, there were 585,368 murders and non-negligent homicides reported 
in the 50 states between 1976 and 2009. Of those, only 21 (<.01%) could 
not be matched to counties; these were excluded from the analysis.104 
After the exclusions of the non-matched cases, our resulting analysis 
sample includes 584,189 homicides between 1976 and 2009. 
2. Case Characteristics 
The SHR includes information on the race, gender and age of both 
offenders and victims, including multiple victims and offenders in such 
incidents. However, this dataset did not include information on victim or 
offender ethnicity, although there was information on victim and offender 
race. Accordingly, our estimates of race-specific clearance rates are based 
on comparisons of Black, White, and Other Race victims. Hispanic 
victims are included in all three categories, based on the identification by 
the agencies reporting the data. 
The county and state where the homicide occurred in included, as 
well as the police agency submitting the report. The SHR also specifies 
the means of killing (firearm, other). The data also includes information 
on the “situation” and “circumstances” of each case, from which we 
determine capital-eligibility. 
3. Capital Eligibility 
We use data from the Death Penalty Information Center to note 
whether each homicide took place in a state-year combination with a valid 
death penalty statute. Within the states, the definition of a capital-eligible 
homicide is determined from an integration of narrow and expansive 
capital-eligibility statutes. Death eligibility varies extensively by state, 
particularly in the range of factors that satisfy the requirement of 
specificity of aggravators.105 Accordingly, we identify homicides as 
 
Epidemiological and Clinical Research: Potential and Pitfalls, 338 BMJ 338-93 (2009).  
 104  We also exclude 5,967 homicides in the District of Columbia. We exclude an 
additional 1,171 homicides in Alaska, which lacks a county structure like that of the other 
49 states.  
 105  See Jonathan Simon & Christine Spaulding, Token of Our Esteem: Aggravating 
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eligible for the death penalty using the procedures developed by 
Professors Fagan, Zimring, and Geller, based on the recurrent language 
of capital-eligible homicides across states.106 
We combine the statutes from three states to compose a definition 
of capital-eligible homicides: Maryland (before abolition of capital 
punishment in 2008),107 Texas,108 and California.109 The California statute 
is similar to the Maryland statute in the configuration of aggravators. 
What makes the California statute unique and quite expansive is its 
extensive array of granularly defined “special circumstances” that qualify 
a murder as death-eligible.110 For this study, we focus on one of 
California’s special circumstances: murder by a street gang member. 
 
Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE (Austin Sarat ed., 1999) 81-116. 
 106  Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & Amanda Geller, Capital Homicide and Capital 
Murder: Market Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1803, 1814-16 (2006).  
 107  1978 MD. LAWS 3 (amended by 1979 MD. LAWS 521). A person is death-eligible if 
he commits murder in the first degree, and (a) the victim of the murder was a law 
enforcement officer, (b) the defendant committed the murder when confined in a 
correctional institution, (c) the defendant committed the murder while trying to escape 
from custody, (d) the victim was taken in the course of a kidnapping or abduction, (e) the 
victim was a child abducted in violation of §3-503 (a) (1) MD. CODE ANN. (2002), (f) 
the defendant murdered pursuant to an agreement for enumeration, (g) the defendant 
employed another who killed for remuneration, (h) the defendant committed murder 
when under sentence of death or life imprisonment, (i) the same incident produced 
multiple murder victims, (j) the defendant committed the murder while committing, or 
attempting to commit, a carjacking, an attempted carjacking, armed carjacking, robbery, 
arson in the first degree, or sexual offense in the first degree (MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 2-303(g)(1) (2002)). 
 108  5 TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03, “Capital Murder.” A person commits criminal homicide 
if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of 
an individual, and (a) the victim is a peace officer or fireman killed while on duty, (b) the 
murder occurred while the defendant was committing (or attempting to commit) a 
kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, or arson; (c) murder “for hire” 
(both the hirer and the hired); (d) the murder occurred during the course of an actual or 
attempted prison break; (e) multiple murders occurred as a result of the defendant’s acts; 
and (f) the victim was younger than ten years old.  
 109  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(22), “Special Circumstance Murder.” The defendant 
intentionally killed the victim and (a) At the time of the killing, the defendant was an 
active participant in a criminal street gang (but s/he does not need to have actually been 
a member); (b) the defendant knew that members of the gang had engaged in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity; and (c) the defendant killed the victim to further the activities of 
the gang. 
 110  See Simon & Spaulding, supra note 106. 
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California’s gang sentencing enhancement provision imposes a harsher 
sentence on a defendant who commits a felony to benefit a street gang.111 
In the case of a murder, it makes the crime death-eligible.112 The inclusion 
of gang killings in this definition reflects the concerns about overbreadth 
in the statute that are the focus of ongoing litigation in federal court.113 
This overbreadth in the California statute is one of the drivers of the high 
population on death row in California.114 Accordingly, the definition of 
capital-eligible homicide includes elements from each of these three 
statutes. 
We developed and applied classification rules in an earlier 
study115 and apply them again here to distinguish capital-eligible from 
non-capital-eligible homicides. The categories that define capital 
eligibility include: felony murders (killings during the course of other 
enumerated crimes), killings of children six years of age or younger, 
multiple-victim killings, “gangland” killings, “institution” killings, sniper 
killings, killings during drug transactions, and contract killings.116 
Applying this definition, figure 1 shows the distribution of capital-eligible 
and other homicides from 1976-2016. 
 
 
 111  CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22. (a) Any person who actively participates in any criminal 
street gang with knowledge that the members of the gang or active participants engage in 
or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who (1) commits, alone or in 
concert, a felony that is one of the gang’s primary activities and is set forth in subdivision 
(e), (2) aids or abets any felony committed by a member of, or an active participant in, 
that gang, or (3) willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct 
by members of, or an active participant in, that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment 
in a county jail for a period not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison 
for 16 months, or two or three years. False (C). If the felony is a violent felony, as defined 
in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, the person shall be punished by an additional term of 
10 years. 
 112  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(22). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f).  
 113  Ashmus v. Wong, No. 93-CV-00594 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 114  Id. (Declaration of David C. Baldus). 
 115  See Fagan et al., supra note 107, at 1814-16.  
 116  See id.  
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Source: Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 101; Fox & Fridel, supra 
note 103 
 
The rate of capital-eligibility over time was quite stable over time. 
Figure 1 shows little fluctuation in the number of capital-eligible 
homicides over the three-decade period. Nearly all the year-to-year 
changes in homicides were due to changes in the rate of homicides 
ineligible for capital punishment. These distinct spikes in homicides 
reflected several factors, including the emergence of street-level drug 
markets and the violence associated with them.117 This increase in 
homicides may also reflect the shift in homicide methods from non-gun 
to gun homicides in the 1970s118 that continued through drug epidemics 
which, when combined with increasingly lethal weaponry, resulted in 
increases in the peaks of the successive drug epidemics.119 
4. County Factors 
We include several measures that provide a social context for 
explaining county homicide and clearance rates. We develop these indicia 
 
 117  See also Jacqueline Cohen & George Tita, Diffusion in homicide: Exploring a general 
method for detecting spatial diffusion processes, 15 J.  QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 455-
65 (1999); Daniel Cork, Examining Space-Time Interaction in City-Level Homicide 
Data: Crack Markets and the Diffusion of Guns Among Youth, 15 J. QUANT. 
CRIMINOLOGY 379, 380-81 (1999). 
 118  See generally Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, CRIME IS NOT THE 
PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997). 
 119  See, e.g., Fagan et al., supra note 72. 
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based on an extension of Donald Black’s theory of the behavior of the 
law.120 Professor Black characterizes law and its agents as the fabric of 
social control.121 Black suggests that the law will mobilize to investigate 
crimes, particularly salient crimes including murder, but the extent of this 
legal mobilization will vary according to characteristics of the case. In 
later writing, he expands his theory to include features of the social 
context in which the case and the investigation take place, with an 
emphasis on social structural factors including racial composition, 
aggregate criminal activity, and social organization.122 We include racial 
composition to account for the potential for conflict theories and the 
concentrated disadvantage to influence legal mobilization of law 
enforcement and the courts.123 
We adapt his theory to the diverse contexts of counties across the 
U.S. Accordingly, we include county racial composition, poverty rates, 
and population density. Crime rates in the county included homicide and 
robbery rates. For homicides, we used the rates of murder and 
manslaughter from the Uniform Crime Reports for each calendar quarter. 
We also link a range of social structural and demographic data about the 
states and counties with U.S. Census data and data from other federal 
datasets. We account for the criminal justice context of the county and 
local policing capacity based on Criminal Justice Employment and 
Expenditure (CJEE) data,124 supplemented with data from the Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed in Action (LEOKA) database.125 Because 
 
 120  See BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, supra note 14, at 2; see also Borg & Parker, 
supra note 14, at 437.  
 121  Robert J. Sampson, Crime in Cities: The Effect of Formal and Informal Social 
Control, 8 CRIME & JUST. 271, 281-82 (1986); David L. Weisburd, Elizabeth R. Groff & 
Sue-Ming Yang, Understanding and Controlling Hot Spots of Crime: The Importance of 
Formal and Informal Social Controls, 15 PREVENTION SCI. 31, 40 (2014). 
 122  See Donald Black, The Epistemology of Pure Sociology, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 829 
(1995); Borg and Parker, supra note 14, at 446-48.  
 123  Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and 
Urban Inequality, in RACE, CRIME, AND JUSTICE: A READER 37 (1995); SEAN L. 
GABBIDON, CRIMINOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND CRIME (2015); Darnell F. 
Hawkins, Beyond Anomalies: Rethinking the Conflict Perspective on Race and Criminal 
Punishment, 65 SOC. FORCES 719 (1987); David Jacobs, Inequality and Police Strength: 
Conflict Theory and Coercive Control in Metropolitan Areas, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 913 
(1979).   
 124  NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT 
DATA FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (various years), available at 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/eecjs.html. 
 125  U.S. DEPT. JUST., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
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census data is decennial, we use only data through 2009 for analyses that 
control for county characteristics and criminal justice expenditures and 
personnel. 
Finally, to estimate whether the presence of a valid death statute 
incentivizes police investigations of potentially capital-eligible 
homicides, we use data from the Death Penalty Information Center to 
measure whether each homicide takes place in a county, state and year 
with a valid death penalty statute.126 
5. Clearance Rates 
We use clearance rates to estimate the production of a supply of 
capital-eligible homicides eligible for prosecution. From the SHR, any 
homicide where there was offender information was considered “cleared” 
and included in the supply of cases that could become death cases.127 We 
did the same for robberies. Robberies were included since (a) felony 
murders were the majority of capital-eligible homicides, and (b) robberies 
were the majority of predicate crimes in the broader category of felony 
murders.128 
B. Analysis 
We used hierarchical logit models to identify the factors that 
explained the differences in the supply of capital-eligible cases as 
measured by clearance rates. This class of multivariate models is 
particularly sensitive to the processes where the effects of variables at one 
level of explanation—here, case characteristics—are moderated by the 
context in which they operate—here, counties or states.129 
 
KILLED AND ASSAULTED (various years), available at https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/. 
 126  DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., YEAR END REPORT: THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2017 
(2018), available at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/YearEnd2017. 
 127  We could not estimate the clearance rate for Black Offender-White Victim (BO/WV), 
or Other Race Offender – White Victim (OO/WV) homicides. Our definition of clearance 
required the identification of an offender in the SHR data. At the police stage, offender 
race is usually unknown until a suspect has been identified and arrested. According, all 
BO/WV and OO/WV cases were by definition cleared, and were identified only by victim 
race in the analyses. 
 128  Fagan, Zimring & Geller, supra note 107, at 1819. 
 129  See generally STEPHEN W. RAUDENBUSH & ANTHONY S. BRYK, HIERARCHICAL 
LINEAR MODELS: APPLICATIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS METHODS (2d ed.) (2002); 
ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2006); Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, Anders Skrondal & 
Andrew Pickles, Generalized Multilevel Structural Equation Modeling, 69 
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The model takes the general form of: 
 
Logit-1(Cleari,j) = β0,j*i + β1,j*VicRacei,j + β2*Casei,j + εi,j 
 
. . .where β0,j = δ0 + δ1*Countyj + δ2*State + ηj identifies county 
parameter estimates for country j in each year, and β1,j = δ0 + δ1*Countyj 
+ δ2*State + ηj identifies the effects of county parameter estimates on 
whether a case was cleared by victim race and the effects of the presence 
of a death statute, and is a vector of state covariates, including whether 
the state was death state in each period. Each regression includes a linear 
function for time (calendar quarter) and time. The second term accounts 
for the curvilinear shape of the curves on total homicides. 
Coefficients from the logit estimations therefore represent the 
odds ratio of clearance rates for each construct of interest, beginning with 
race and then iteratively adding additional potential explanatory factors. 
We begin with a model that measures the unadjusted difference in 
clearance rates between homicides by victim race. From these models, we 
can determine the odds of a homicide being “cleared” via arrest in each 
year. The analyses proceed in stages, additional variables are included at 
each iteration to examine the influence of various categories of case, 
victim, or county characteristics on the likelihood that a capital-eligible 
homicide will be cleared. We estimate several iterations of each model 
with different combinations of predictors. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of cases during the study period by 
type of homicide. Of the 613,602 homicides during the study period, 
25.2% were classified as capital-eligible. This parameter is consistent 
with the rate reported by Fagan et al. (2006) using the same definition for 
the 1974-2003 period. The point estimate is similar to the estimate 
reported in studies where researchers systematically reviewed the details 
of each case to determine death-eligibility. For example, based on the 
construction of a definition based on statutes and a case-level file review, 
Paternoster et al. found that 25.7% of cases in Maryland from 1978-1999 
were capital-eligible, including 21.8% of the cases of intra-race 
killings.130 In Georgia, the Atlanta Journal Constitution used a similar 
 
PSYCHOMETRIKA 167 (2004); Thaxton, supra note 85. 
 130  Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, Reassessing Race Disparities in Maryland 
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method of case review to determine the rate of capital-eligible cases from 
1994-2005.131 Their analysis showed a rate of 27.4% of all first and 
second degree murders, a rate higher than that reported in Georgia for a 
period a decade earlier despite using the same coding and classification 
procedure. 
  
 
Capital Cases, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 971, 984, 989 (2008). 
 131  See Rankin et al., supra note 63; Fagan & Paternoster, supra note 98. 
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Table 1. Capital Eligible Homicides, All States, 1976-2016  
Capital-Eligible Homicides by Category 
 
  % of All % of Capital- 
Category* N Homicides 
Eligible 
Homicides 
Homicides during Crimes 67,972 11.1 51.4 
Institution Killings 929 0.2 0.7 
Gangland Killings 3,123 0.5 2.2 
Youth Gang Killings 20,177 3.3 15.5 
Sniper Killings 519 0.1 0.4 
Murders of Children 6 and 
younger 27,557 4.5 13.8 
Killings of Police Officers 2,753 0.4 4.1 
Multiple Victims 50,286 8.2 17.9 
Total Capital Eligible** 154,321 25.2 100.0 
Total Non-Capital Eligible 359,281 74.8  
    
Total 613,602 100.0  
Capital-Eligible Homicides during Crimes by Crime Type 
  % of All % of Capital- 
Category N Homicides 
Eligible 
Homicides 
Robbery 54,012 8.8 44.0 
Rape 3,994 0.7 2.6 
Burglary 5,661 0.9 3.7 
Arson 4,305 0.7 2.8 
    
Total 67,972 11.1 51.4 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Uniform Crime Reports, Supplemental Homicide Reports, 
1978-2016 various years. Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement 
Officers Killed in Action, various years. 
* Homicides are limited to those committed by offenders aged 16 or 
above from 1976-2005. After 2005, minors were no longer eligible for 
capital punishment (Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Homicides 
by offenders of unknown ages also are excluded. Homicides committed 
by offenders younger than 16 are not considered capital-eligible, and 
homicides by offenders under the age of 16 were not eligible for 
execution following (Thompson v, Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 1988). 
** Total Capital Eligible Homicides is less than the sum of the individual 
categories, due to overlaps in the categories. For example, 6,007 
homicides committed during the course of other crimes had multiple 
victims, and 697 homicides committed in the course of other crimes had 
multiple offenders. The 2,753 killings of police officers are included in 
other capital-eligible crimes. Killings of police officers exclude the 
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deaths of 92 police officers resulting from the events of September 11, 
2001. 
Table 1 shows that over half (51.1%) of the capital-eligible 
homicides in this period were felony murders, or murders that were 
committed in the course of another felony offense. Of these, over four in 
five (44.0% of the 51.4%) were killings committed during robberies. 
Regardless of whether the offender intended to kill the victim, felony 
murders remain eligible crimes for the most serious available punishment 
in 49 of the 50 states and in federal criminal law.132 Other common 
categories of capital-eligible murders include gang killings (15.5%) and 
murders of young children (13.8%). 
Figure 2 shows the total number of homicides and the number of 
homicides by victim race for each year. Accordingly, Latino homicide 
victims are included with the White victim counts. Figure 2 shows a 
higher number of White victims than Black or Other Race victims until 
1988. Homicide victimization rates declined for all groups starting in 
1993, and declined slowly from 2000-2009, the end of the time period for 
the analysis period. The pattern of increase and decline for Black 
homicide victims mirrored the national trend over time. The number of 
White homicide victims was slightly higher prior to 1986. Beginning in 
1987, the pattern of increase and decline for both Black and White victims 
followed the aggregate nationwide pattern. This temporal phase is 
consistent with the onset of the “crack era” in the late 1980s.133 
 
 132  See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
59 (2004); see generally GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER (2012). 
 133  See generally Bruce D. Johnson, Terry Williams, Kojo A. Dei & Harry Sanabria, 
Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Drug Users and the Community, 13 CRIME 
& JUST. 9 (1990); Jeffrey Grogger & Michael Willis, The Emergence of Crack Cocaine 
and the Rise in Urban Crime Rates, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 519 (2000).  
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Source: Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 101; Fox & Fridel, 
supra note 103 
 
Despite common trajectories in homicide victimization, clearance 
rates varied by victim race over time. Figures 3a and 3b show clearance 
rates by victim race, for Black and White victims for capital-eligible 
homicides. While the trends in the total number of capital-eligible 
homicides show slight differences for Black and White victim events, the 
clearance rates are dramatically different. Figure 3a shows that White 
victim homicides declined slowly over time from a 1991 peak, with the 
total number in 2009 nearly half the count from 1996. Clearance rates rose 
by nearly 20 percentage points during the same time, from a low of 62% 
in 1980 to nearly 80% by 2010. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202470 
FAGEN & GELLER FALL 2018 
298 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW Vol. 23:2 
 
 
 
 
Source: Supplementary Homicide Reports, supra note 101; Fox & Fridel, 
supra note 103 
 
We next completed two regressions to determine factors within 
cases as well as in the county contexts that might explain these different 
patterns. Table 2 shows results for a series of iterative models, beginning 
with a baseline model with only victim race and continuing through a final 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202470 
ISSUE 23:3 FALL 2018 
2018 POLICE, RACE, AND HOMICIDE 299 
 
model with all predictors, including whether the homicide took place in a 
county in a state with a valid death statute.134 The regression estimates 
(coefficients) are reported as odds ratios: the odds that the police will clear 
a capital-eligible homicide compared to a non-capital-eligible. An odds 
ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that clearance is more likely, and an odds 
ratio of less than 1.0 indicates that clearance of a homicide for that factor 
is less likely. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Random Effects Logistic Regression of Capital-
Eligible Homicide Clearance Rates, 1976-2009 (Odds 
Ratio, SE, p)   
              
       Model      
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Case 
Factors           
 Victim - Black 0.768  *** 0.762  *** .867 *** 0.905 *** 0.929 *** .927 *** 
    [.009] [.0009] [.016] [.017] [.020] [.020] 
 
Victim - Other 
Race 0.831  *** 0.827  *** .967 0.959 0.93 .929 *** 
    [.022] [.022] [.039] [.040] [.004] [.043] 
 Female Victim  1.386 *** 1.176 *** 1.140 *** 1.098 ** 1.094 *** 
     [.018] [.023] [.023] [.025] [.025] 
 Elderly Victim  .835 *** .801 *** 0.799 *** 0.810 *** 0.814 ** 
     [.032] [.452] [.046] [.051] [.019] 
 Child Victim  4.240  *** 3.751 *** 3.734 *** 3.597 *** 3.564 *** 
     [0.101] [.130] [.137] [.145] [.145] 
 Gun Homicide  0.974  * 1.021 1.080 *** 1.121 *** 1.120 *** 
     [0.013] [.020] [.022] [.025] [.025] 
 Felony Murder  1.098  *** 1.001 0.959 * 0.917 *** 0.916 *** 
     [0.013] [.018 [.018] [.019] [.019] 
 County Factors           
         
.951 
  
** 
 
*  
% Black 
Population     1.582 1.700 
        [.144] [.028] [.035] 
 
% Other Race 
Population     .143 *** 0.183 *** 0.185 *** 
        [.052] [.072] [.064] 
 
Total County 
Population     1.000 *** .999 *** .999 *** 
        [.001] [.0001] [.0001] 
 
 134  The panel was adjusted for death penalty eligibility based on the year of passage of a 
valid post-Gregg statute and also for the abolition of capital punishment in New York 
(2005) and New Jersey (2007). 
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Non-Capital 
Eligible 
Homicides (N)     1.000 *** 1.000 *** 1.000 *** 
        [.0001] [.0006] [.001] 
 
Police Officers 
per Capita       0.984 * 0.959 * 
          [.008] [.008] 
 
Punishment 
Index       0.969 *** 0.877 *** 
          [.005] [.006] 
 
(Log) Robbery 
Rate       0.890 *** 0.863 *** 
          [.015] [.015] 
 Death Statute         .972 
            [.044] 
 Intercept 2.573 *** 1.940 ** 4.524 *** .001 *** .001 *** 122.690 *** 
    [.094] [.077] [.291] [.0005] [.0007] [63.27] 
 N 75,846 75,846 75,846 75,846 61,063 61,063  
 
County Random 
Effect No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 Notes.  All models estimated with 50% sample of cases stratified by death and non-death states. 
 Significance: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p < .001  
 
Model 1 in Table 2 shows only the odds of clearance by victim 
race. Compared to White victims, a murder of a Black victim is 23.2% 
less likely to be cleared (1-.768). For murders of Other Race victims, 
mostly Hispanics, the odds of clearance by arrest are 16.9% lower (1-
.831) than the odds for White victim cases. Model 2 adds characteristics 
of the case, including victim status (elderly, child), gender, and the type 
of murder. The odds by victim race are only slightly changed, and the 
clearance rates for murders with Black or Other Race victims remain 
significantly lower compared to White victim cases. Females and child 
victim cases are significantly more likely to be cleared, and by substantial 
odds: 38.6% more likely for female victims, and 324% more likely for 
child victims. Elderly homicide victim cases are significantly less likely 
(16.5%) compared to younger victim cases. Felony murders are about 
10% more likely to be cleared by arrest, but gun homicide cases are 
slightly less likely (2.6%) to be cleared. 
Model 3 in Table 2 repeats Model 2 but includes a parameter 
(random effect) for the county. The random effect captures unique but 
unmeasured characteristics of the county where the murder took place that 
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might affect the probability of being cleared by arrest.135 The odds of 
clearance by arrest change for some victim or offense characteristics, once 
we account for the possibility of county effects. For Black victim cases, 
the odds remain significantly lower for clearance compared to White 
victim cases, but the odds ratio is higher, 13.3%, nearly half the odds 
compared to Model 2 with no county controls. The odds ratio of clearance 
of an Other Race victim homicide cases are no longer significant. The 
same is true for felony murders and gun homicides. Child victim cases 
and female victim cases again are significantly more likely to be cleared 
compared to adult or male victim cases, but the odds ratios are lower. The 
pattern of results in Model 2 suggest that county context does influence 
the likelihood of clearance of a capital-eligible crime. 
Models 4-6 explore some of the specific features of counties that 
may account for the reduced clearance odds. Model 4 includes the racial 
composition of the county and the total population. It also includes the 
number of non-capital-eligible homicides to account for the total burden 
on police departments of homicide investigations. Model 4 includes 
covariates for race-specific and total population, and the additional non-
capital-eligible homicide investigation caseload. The odds ratio for 
clearance of Black victim homicides decreases compared to the previous 
models in Table 2 with the inclusion of these additional covariates, and 
remains significant and below 1.0. The difference in this odds ratio in 
Model 4 is about .038, of 3.8% less chance of clearance. The results for 
Other Race victim capital-eligible homicides remains essentially 
unchanged. 
Model 4, then, suggests that there are race-specific population 
dynamics that slightly increase the odds of clearance for a Black victim 
homicide, but the gap in the likelihood of clearance compared to 
similarly-situated White victim homicides remains nearly 10%. 
Model 5 adds parameters of the criminal justice environment of 
the counties, including police resources, crime rates and incarceration 
rates per crime (punishment index). The odds ratio for clearance of a 
 
 135  See, e.g., Andrew Bell & Kelvyn Jones, Explaining Fixed Effects: Random Effects 
Modeling of Time-Series Cross-Sectional and Panel Data, 3 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 
133 (2015); Enrique Gracia Fuster et al., Exploring Neighborhood Influences on Small-
Area Variations in Intimate Partner Violence Risk: A Bayesian Random-Effects Modeling 
Approach, 11 INT. J. ENV. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 866 (2014); Tom S. Clark & Drew A. 
Linzer, Should I Used Fixed or Random Effects?, 3 POL. SCI. RES & METHODS 399 
(2015). 
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Black victim capital-eligible homicide remains significant but increase by 
about .024 (2.4%) with the addition of covariates reflecting the criminal 
justice context. In addition, the percent Black population was not 
significant in Model 4 but becomes significant in Model 5, and is 
relatively large. Among the variables added in Model 5, several are 
significant and the odds ratios are below 1.0. These additional variables 
suggest that a stronger criminal justice context decreases the odds of 
clearance overall of a capital eligible homicide. Together, the context 
variables have little influence on changes in the odds of clearance of a 
either a Black victim or an Other Race capital-eligible homicide. 
Model 6 includes the presence of a death statute in the county 
where the homicide took place, a proxy for the possibility that the prospect 
of a death sentence may incentivize police to more aggressively pursue 
capital-eligible homicide investigations. The presence of a death statute 
in the county where the homicide took place has almost no effect on the 
clearance rates: the odds of clearance in a county in a state with a valid 
death statute are 2.8% lower than other counties, but the effect is not 
significant. The odds ratio of clearance of an Other Race victim capital-
eligible homicide changes little but become significant in Model 6 with 
the addition of the death statute variable to the regression. 
The regressions in Table 3 examine the effects of capital-eligible 
homicides by disaggregating the results from Model 6 in Table 2 into 
separate estimates for death and non-death states. Model 1 in Table 3 
repeats the results of Model 6 in Table 2, and provides a basis to compare 
the results of the disaggregated models. For Black victim homicides, he 
clearance rate is 8.2% lower compared to White victim homicides in death 
states. In non-death states, the odds ratio is not significant. Neither state 
model shows a significant odds ratio for clearance of Other Race capital-
eligible homicides. The difference between the two estimates hints at 
incentives for clearing White victim that may reflect the presence of a 
death statute in the county. The effects for non-capital eligible homicides 
are significant in both models, but the odds ratios barely differ from 1.0. 
This is a result without practical significance.136 
  
 
 136  For a discussion of the distinction between statistical and practical significant, see 
generally Roger E. Kirk, Practical Significance: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 56 
EDUC. & PSYCH. MEASUREMENT 746 (1996); see also Chet Miller, Andreas Schwab & 
William H. Starbuck, Moving Beyond Tradition: Why and How to Replace Statistical 
Significance Tests with Better Methods, ACAD. MANAGEMENT PROCEEDINGS (2017).  
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Table 3. Random Effects Logistic Regression of Capital-Eligible 
Homicide Clearance Rates in Counties in Death and Non-Death 
States, 1976-2009 (OR, SE, p)   
    Counties in 
All States 
 Counties in 
Death States 
Counties in 
Non-Death State      
    1  2  3 
 
Case 
Factors        
 Victim - Black 0.929 *** 0.918 *** .963 
    [.020] [.021] [.047] 
 Victim - Other Race 0.93 0.927 .979 
    [.004] [.047] [.112] 
 Female Victim 1.098 ** 1.103 *** .1.073 
    [.025] [.028] [.055] 
 Elderly Victim 0.810 *** 0.886 .590 *** 
    [.051] [.063] [.075] 
 Child Victim 3.597 *** 3.823 *** 2.913 *** 
    [.145] [0.176] [.244] 
 Gun Homicide 1.121 *** 1.139 *** 1.051 
    [.025] [0.029] [.052] 
 Felony Murder 0.917 *** 0.878 *** 1.113 *** 
    [.019] [0.021] [.054] 
 
County 
Factors        
 % Black Population 1.582 ** 2.053 *** 1.022 
    [.028] [0.382] [.673] 
 % Other Race Population 0.183 *** 0.141 *** 0.198 * 
    [.072] [0.071] [.137] 
 Total County Population .999 *** 1.000 *** 1.000 *** 
    [.0001] [0.0001] [.0001] 
 
Non-Capital Eligible 
Homicides 1.000 *** 1.000 *** 1.000 * 
    [.0006] [0.0001] [.001] 
 Police Officers per Capita 0.984 * 0.972 * 0.993 
    [.008] [0.012] [.011] 
 Punishment Index 0.969 *** 0.960 *** 0.969 
    [.005] [0.006] [.025] 
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 (Log) Robbery Rate 0.890 *** 0.870 *** 0.89 *** 
    [.015] [0.017] [.022] 
 Intercept .001 *** 1.940 *** 2.556 *** 
    [.0007] [.077] [.983] 
 N 61,063  49,805  11,504  
 
Notes. Models estimated with 50% sample, stratified by statute. All models 
estimated with year fixed effects and random intercept by County. 
Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p < .001 
 
The comparison of odds ratios for the county context variables 
suggest other social processes at work in producing cleared capital-
eligible homicides. First, and most importantly, the odds of clearance in 
counties in death penalty states is significantly higher as the proportion of 
Black residents in the county increases. In non-death states, the result is 
not significant. The contrast between the case-level effect (lower 
clearance rates for Black victim homicides) and higher clearance rates in 
predominantly Black counties suggests stronger efforts to clear capital-
eligible murders that are not proportional to the county’s racial 
demography. The same is true in counties with higher incarceration rates 
(punishment index). Perhaps this reflects that racial threat or conflict137 
are motivating variables in death states to clear the most serious 
homicides, and to have a more punitive criminal justice system, but the 
justice benefits of policing do not extend to Black victims’ families. 
Second, clearance rates of capital-eligible homicides are slightly 
lower (2.8%) in counties where there is a stronger police presence. But 
this effect is present only in death states; there is no effect in non-death 
states. The same is true for incarceration rates: the clearance rates of 
capital-eligible homicides also are slightly lower (4.0%) in counties where 
the punishment index (incarceration rate) is higher. Among crime 
conditions, there functionally no difference in death and non-death states 
in the influence of non-capital-eligible homicides, nor for robbery rates. 
Third, there are differences in death and non-death states for 
certain case characteristics. Clearance rates are significantly higher for 
female victims in death states; the odds ratio is not significant in non-
 
 137  See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer, Race and Policing in Different Ecological Contexts, in 
RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS (M. White & S. Rice 
eds., 2010); see also Borg & Parker, supra note 14; BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, 
supra note 14. 
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death states. The clearance rates are higher for child victims in both death 
and non-death states, but the odds ratio is nearly 25% higher in death 
states. Gun homicide clearance rates are significant and higher in death 
states, but there is no effect in non-death state. Felony murders have the 
opposite effects in death and non-death states: felony murders are less 
likely (12.2%) in death states, but more likely to be cleared in non-death 
states (11.3% higher). 
To illustrate the sensitivity of clearance rates to variation in 
county contextual effects, we estimated the marginal effects of clearance 
rates by county racial composition. Figure 4 shows LOESS estimates of 
the effects of the county Black population on clearance rates for capital-
eligible homicides.138 Donald Black suggested that the percent of minority 
population would affect the behavior of legal institutions with respect to 
minority and disadvantaged populations.139 The political and social 
priorities of legal agencies would vary with the status of the affected 
population. Figure 4 confirms Black’s prediction. Clearance rates for 
capital-eligible homicides decline as the Black share of the county 
population increases beyond 20%. About 75% of capital eligible 
homicides are cleared when the Black population is below 20%. At the 
other end of the distribution, the clearance rate drops below 60% when 
the Black population is about 75% of the county population. These 
estimates are controlled for the total homicide rate, the total population 
and the overall homicide rate. 
 
 138  LOESS (LOcally WEighted Scatter-plot Smoother) estimates a boosted regression 
model that shows the relationship of two variables across levels of the predictor variable, 
with the option to include other variables in the LOESS estimates. This is a nonparametric 
method because the linearity assumptions of conventional regression methods have been 
relaxed. Instead of estimating parameters in a standard regression model, a LOESS 
nonparametric regression focuses on the fitted curve. The fitted points and their standard 
errors represent are estimated with respect to the whole curve rather than a particular 
estimate of one predictor. See generally Matthias Schonlau, Boosted Regression 
(Boosting): An Introductory Tutorial and a Stata Plugin, 5 STATA J. 330 (2005).  
 139  BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LAW, supra note 14. 
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Figure 5 shows the importance of police presence in improving 
the clearance rate for capital eligible homicides.140 These also are LOESS 
estimates that control for police strength per capita, the number of capital-
eligible homicides, and the total population. At low per capita police 
strength (15 or fewer officers per 1,000 persons), clearance rates hover 
around 60%. When police strength increases above 15 officers per 1,000 
persons, the clearance rate for capital eligible homicides increases to 
nearly 80%. Counties with more police officers have obvious advantages 
in investigations of homicides overall. But even with these advantages, 
Figure 4 shows that disparities remain in clearance rates that privilege 
White victim homicides in the search for justice. 
Figure 6 shows that clearance rates are higher when the robbery 
rate is lower, but clearance rates for capital-eligible homicides decline as 
the robbery rate increases. Robbery is a salient crime, and often the 
 
 140  To illustrate the meaning of police strength in terms of county or city size, the city of 
Cincinnati has a population of approximately 298,800 in 2016. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
QUICKFACTS, available at 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/cincinnaticityohio/PST045216. There are 
approximately 1,000 sworn officers in the Cincinnati Police Department. See also 
CINCINNATI POLICE, https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). 
This translates into a rate of 3.35 officers per 1,000 population. 
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politics of local criminal justice are influenced by robbery, one of the 
salient fear-inducing crimes.141 Robbery rates also are significantly higher 
in cities with higher concentrations of Black populations.142 Accordingly, 
the lower clearance rates for Black victim capital-eligible homicides 
overall means that these cases may compete with robberies for scarce 
investigations resources in smaller police agencies.143 In these models, the 
Black victim homicide odds ratio estimates the clearance odds of Black 
victim cases relative to White victim cases. If there is a competition for 
investigative resources, the results in Table 3 suggest that they are 
allocated differently in death and non-death states, and that there is more 
attention to the politically salient robbery cases at the expense of Black 
victim capital-eligible homicides. 
Figure 7 shows that the incarceration rate has a small negative 
effect on capital-eligible clearance rates. There are no simple explanations 
for the connection between incarceration rates and homicide clearance 
rates, other than local priorities. Higher rates of incarceration consume 
police resources, diverting police in these places from homicide 
investigations, which may be difficult to clear for Black victims, to 
investigation of other felonies that translate into prison sentences in court. 
If this is a resource allocation question, then the priorities set by police 
executives seem to slightly devalue the agency’s performance in 
investigation of capital-eligible cases when the victim is Black. Perhaps 
it’s easier to obtain convictions for drug crimes or other priority crimes in 
a police agency, compared to Black victim capital-eligible homicides. If 
that is the case, police executives are simply maximizing their returns for 
higher rate crimes (robberies, drug crimes) and devaluing the pursuit of 
the more difficult homicide cases. That this choice is conflated with race 
suggests either neglect or indifference to Black homicide victims. 
These results suggest that the race-of-victim disparities in capital 
sentencing observed by Baldus et al. in McCleskey and others throughout 
 
 141  See, e.g., DAN A. LEWIS & GRETA W. SALEM, FEAR OF CRIME: INCIVILITY AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM (2017); GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET 
CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA (1999); RALPH B. TAYLOR, 
BREAKING AWAY FROM BROKEN WINDOWS: BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE 
NATIONWIDE FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, GRIME, FEAR, AND DECLINE (2000). 
 142  Sampson, supra note 122.  
 143  See, e.g., LEOVY, supra note 59, at 20-26 (describing the tensions between the LAPD 
homicide divisions in poorer, predominantly Black and Latino areas of South Los 
Angeles and the robbery-homicide divisions that investigate these crimes in wealthy areas 
of that city).  
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the post-Furman era can be traced to procedural disparities that long 
precede charging and sentencing decisions, and are observed as early as 
the clearance of capital-eligible homicides. Much of this observed 
disparity can be explained by the varying social contexts in which White-
victim and minority-victim homicides occur, and also by the geography 
of capital punishment law. Most notably, in large counties, and counties 
with large concentrations of minority residents, capital-eligible homicides 
are significantly more likely to be cleared, but Black victim capital 
eligible homicides are less likely to be cleared. Especially for White 
victim homicides, the lower clearance rates in death states for non-White 
victim homicides suggests a premium on White lives for justice and 
retribution for capital crimes that may not be present in the absence of an 
option to impose the most severe punishment available. This may tell us 
as much about the legal institutions and their preferences and tastes for 
punishment as it does about the features of the homicides that begin the 
supply process that can lead to execution. 
DISCUSSION 
The race-of-victim disparities in capital sentencing observed by 
Baldus et al. (1987), the General Accounting Office (1990), and others 
summarized by Professor Grosso et al.144 can be traced to procedural 
disparities that precede prosecutorial charging decisions and jurors’ 
sentencing decisions. These disparities can be observed as early as the 
police investigations and clearance of capital-eligible homicides. A 
substantial portion of this observed disparity can be explained by the 
varying social contexts in which White-victim and minority-victim 
homicides occur. The importance of context can be seen initially and 
perhaps most starkly in the third column of Table 2, in which the addition 
of county-level intercepts substantially reduces the marginal difference 
between White-victim and minority-victim clearance rates, and these gaps 
are further narrowed as additional county-level characteristics are 
controlled for. But it’s also important to remember that there is robust 
evidence of a Black victim homicide clearance disparity, net of a host of 
case and context factors, that seems to initiate a process that carries 
forward to prosecutorial decisions. 
Still, much remains to be learned about the contextual factors that 
influence homicide clearance, or explain the differences between White 
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and Black victim capital-eligible homicide clearance rates. Clearance 
rates are significantly lower in counties that contain greater proportions 
of Black residents; however, we know little about the socioeconomic or 
criminal justice factors in those places that explain these differences. 
Moreover, controlling both crime conditions and criminal justice contexts 
explains virtually none of the relationship between county Black 
population and case clearance. And there is little in these data to explain 
the extremely low clearance odds in counties with higher proportions of 
“Other Race” populations.145 
Our findings suggest that the equal protection concerns raised by 
Baldus et al. (1987) about capital punishment continue to resonate in the 
modern legal system. To the extent that race-of-victim disparities can be 
traced to procedural differences, or resource limitations in places where 
minority-victim homicides take place, they may potentially be mitigated 
by equalizing the distribution of police resources across regions. 
However, racial disparities that exceed those predicted by the unequal 
distribution of resources raise serious doubts as to whether the death 
penalty can be equitably applied. 
If racism is relevant in the charging and prosecution of capital-
eligible defendants,146 is there a different form of racism that explains the 
inability of police to achieve parity in police investigations of capital-
eligible homicides? Why the difficulty in clearing Black victim capital-
eligible homicides, if not all homicides? Certainly, some of the clearance 
gap can be traced to differences in the variety of homicides, and in the 
differences in communities of different racial and ethnic makeups to 
cooperate with police. 
For example, we find that felony murders are less likely to be 
cleared via arrest. These account for nearly half of all capital-eligible 
homicides, and are more likely to involve stranger crimes including 
robbery and burglary. Recent research has shown that residents of 
neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime tend to be places where 
there is less willingness of communities of different racial and ethnic 
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makeups to cooperate with police.147 In these same places, racial 
preferences among police administrators may also dilute both the skills 
and experiences of police assigned to investigate homicides in those 
areas.148 In general, there likely is a cooperation gap that may stifle police 
investigations of homicides, whether capital-eligible or not, in non-White 
communities that suffer from higher rates of both crime and aggressive 
policing.149 
But then, why the cooperation gap? Even as crime rates declined 
for two decades, tensions between citizens and police rose, especially 
among African Americans150 and, to a lesser extent, among Latinos.151 In 
the 1990s, at the outset of the homicide and general crime decline, much 
of the distrust was focused on racial profiling by police.152 Over time, the 
distrust of police by minority citizens expanded to include police use of 
force,153 and later, everyday policing of disorder.154 
When there is a White homicide victim, police may sense more 
urgency and scrutiny of their efforts, leading to higher clearance rates 
compared to Black or Latino victim killings.155 In her NPR series, Martin 
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quotes crime reporter Rocco Parascondola’s reports that clearance rates 
of murders in New York City in 2013 were nearly twice as high for White 
victims (86%) compared to Black victim homicides (45%) or Latino 
victim homicides (56%).156 He cited a growing “no snitch” culture that 
militates against cooperation with police, a sign of the weak police 
legitimacy in non-White neighborhoods. Witness intimidation may also 
be a factor in low cooperation.157 
Distrust today is a two-way street. Fagan and Richman briefly 
touched on signs of a police pullback or withdrawal in the face of citizen 
and political criticism, extensive video surveillance and publicity of 
contested police actions, and recent killings of police.158 Recent claims of 
a police pullback in the face of criticism from communities affected by 
aggressive policing and visible acts of police violence deepen the distrust. 
Police in these circumstances reflects loosely coupled systems of distrust 
and resentment between citizens and police that entwines violence, 
cynicism and public safety into a complex and tangled ecology. Our sense 
is that the language of a “chill wind” adopted by FBI Director Comey159 
is meant to capture the connections in these mechanisms, and their 
consequences for policing homicide, particularly in urban areas. 
The sources of the cooperation gap may also be traceable to the 
common use of aggressive and proactive policing models in practice for 
over two decades in many American cities.160 Even as crime rates 
declined for two decades, tensions between citizens and police rose, 
especially among African Americans161 and also among Latinos.162 In the 
1990s, at the outset of the homicide and general crime decline, much of 
the distrust was focused on racial profiling by police.163 Over time, the 
distrust of police by minority citizens expanded to include police use of 
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force,164 and later, everyday policing of disorder.165 In some instances, 
these norms of withdrawal, distrust and resistance become norms that are 
shared across generations and neighborhoods.166 
In several cities, people living in neighborhoods where homicide 
is a recurring reality share a narrative about policing, community, and 
murder that is strikingly similar. The stories they tell portray a social 
context where murders are not uncommon but remain unsolved, where 
citizens experience policing as detached from serious crime and aimed at 
the wrong behaviors and the wrong people, where policing is seen as 
indifferent or disrespectful if not abusive, where citizens are unwilling to 
cooperate in murder investigations by the police whom they view as an 
“occupation force,” and where these interlocking forces create a 
reinforcing dynamic that deepens the social and economic isolation of 
places that already have the features of a “poverty trap.” Beyond the 
inability to provide security, citizens’ direct and vicarious experiences are 
often internalized as perceived injustices. Under these circumstances, 
withdrawal from cooperation with police in homicide investigations isn’t 
surprising. 
In a web of recurring social interactions, these perceptions—a 
variety of police insults and recurring episodes of murder and other 
violence—engender frustration and anger and in turn, withdrawal from 
cooperation with the police.167 Perceived injustices can disincentivize 
citizens from cooperating with the police, including both “petty 
indignities” and egregious acts of police violence.168 
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CONCLUSION 
In a 2015 speech, as homicide rates were spiking in several cities 
and protests against police killings of Black citizens roiled several 
states,169 former FBI Director Comey spoke of “two lines: one line is law 
enforcement and the other line is the folks we serve and protect, especially 
in communities of color.” And he worried that “those two lines are arcing 
away from each other, at an increasing rate.”170 This extends to trust for 
homicide investigations, including capital-eligible homicides.171 
Clearance rates matter in reassuring people that police are dedicated to 
their safety, and that they can deliver on promises of security. As these 
three case studies show, the trust and cooperation of citizens is essential 
to reducing murder by leveraging their cooperation in homicide 
investigations. Plunket and Lundman, for example, suggested nearly 15 
years ago as homicide rates were plunging in most cities, that “the 
significantly lower clearance rates in Black census tracts and integrated 
census tracts are a function of less trust and less cooperation and 
information from citizens.” They noted, “[w]hen people are reluctant to 
talk to homicide detectives, when they are uneasy about telling homicide 
detectives what they saw, what they know, and what they suspect, the 
necessary result is lower clearance rates.”172 We find much the same 
today. 
 
 
CRIMINOLOGY 847, 864-73 (2009). 
 169  See Fagan & Richman, supra note 92. 
 170  James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Address at the University of Chicago Law School: 
Law Enforcement and the Communities We Serve: Bending the Lines Toward Safety and 
Justice (Oct. 23, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/law-
enforcement-and-the-communities-we-serve-bending-the-lines-toward-safety-and-
justice). 
 171  See, e.g., LEOVY, supra note 59.  
 172  Janice L. Puckett & Richard J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: 
Multivariate Analysis of a Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 171, 185 (2003); see also Susan Clampet-Lundquist et al., The Sliding 
Scale of Snitching: A Qualitative Examination of Snitching in Three Philadelphia 
Communities, 30 SOC. FORUM 265 (2015). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3202470 
